In The West : First Attempts at Reform [2/6]

Dar Al-Islam (The Abode of Islam)

Taking into account two of the four elements mentioned in the preceding section, al-Dusuqi, of the Maliki school, declared that the abode of Islam³ must be the property of Muslims where the Islamic legal system is applied (even if non-Muslims are in power).⁴ This is the current legal opinion, also held by Ibn Taymiyya, while the ulama of the Hanifi school focused on the very specific issue of whether practicing Muslims were in a position of safety. So, in their opinion, as expressed by the Hanafi al-Sarakhsi, one could know that one was in the “abode of Islam” by the fact that Muslims there were secure and had nothing to fear by practicing their religion. For this school of law, it was the question of security and protection, and not the strict question of Islam and kufr (here in the sense of nonacceptance of Islam), that had to be taken into consideration in making the judgment.

Dar Al-Harb (The Abode of War)

Numerous definitions for the concept of dar al-harb⁵ have been proposed, and there are important differences between the ulama with regard to the best of them. Nevertheless the ulama are unanimous in holding that a country is called dar al-harb when the legal system as well as the government are non-Islamic. The consensus is that this description is dependent not on the population, which may be majority-Muslim, but rather on the law and the political system. For the Hanafi school, in contrast to dar alislam, dar al-harb is a territory where Muslims are neither protected nor able to live in peace. But, as the various definitions show, the existence of an “abode of war” does not necessarily mean that a state of war exists between the opposing “abodes.”

An intensive study of these definitions (though they cannot be presented here very exhaustively or in great detail) shows that the criteria on which the specific and reliable recognition of an “abode” depends are not strictly antithetical. Most of the ulama insist on ownership of the land and the application of the Islamic legal system in order to declare the existence of a dar al-islam, while it is the nature of the legal system and that of the government that are the relevant factors for a dar al-harb. In the first case, the stress is on the population and in the second on the government. This asymmetry is actually the cause of a deep divergence between contemporary ulama, for they all admit that the Islamic system (which is the second condition that must apply to allow an area to be defined as Islamic) is not truly or fully implemented anywhere today.

Thus, some ulama take the population into account and are of the opinion that Muslim countries should continue to be considered as dar alislam, while others, focusing on governments that according to all the evidence do not apply the teachings of Islam, maintain that these countries cannot be called dar al-islam. If, however, we take into account the criteria based on notions of safety and security that are considered by some ulama of the Hanafi school,, the conclusion might be very different, even diametrically opposed: Muslims may feel safer in the West, as far as the free exercise of their religion is concerned, than in some so-called Muslim countries. This analysis could lead us to conclude, on the basis of the criteria of safety and security, that the description dar al-islam is applicable to almost all Western countries, while it can hardly be given to the great majority of actual Muslim countries, whose population is 60, 70, 80, or even 95 percent Muslim. This reversal in the respective descriptions of the West and Muslim countries is “certainly impossible,” states Shaykh al-Mawlawi:⁶ apart from the measure of security, all the evidence points to the fact that we really are not in a “Muslim country.”

This debate, apart from the problems of definition that it raises, is based on old concepts that seem to be neither operational nor relevant in our time. To apply them to our contemporary reality just as they were thought out by the great ulama more than ten centuries ago would be a serious methodological error. In today’s world, where populations are in constant movement and in which we are witnessing an increasing complexity in the distribution of economic, financial, and political power, as well as a diversification of strategic alliances and spheres of influence, it is impossible to hold to an old, simple, binary vision of reality. That being so, this set of readings is totally inappropriate: it could lead to a simplistic and clearly erroneous perception of our times.

Even the addition of the third concept, introduced by al-Shafii, which refers to the “abode of treaty” (dar al-ahd), is not enough to extract us from this binary view of the world. This description assumes that there are countries that, although not Muslim from a political point of view, have nevertheless signed a treaty of peace and collaboration with one or several Muslim nations. The treaty may be temporary or permanent, and this concept of dar al-ahd presents an interesting opening if it can be adapted to the current political situation on an international scale. The existence of organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity and the numerous treaties signed by states represent a clear implementation of this notion of dar al-ahd. This is the opinion of Shaykh Manna al-Qattan, according to whom “this is the appropriate description to be applied to the majority of countries as far as relations with Muslims are concerned.”⁷ Perhaps this concept can shed new light on our way of looking at the world that surrounds us. However, a careful analysis shows that this category cannot give an adequate vision of our present situation. The concept of dar al-ahd has specific meaning only in the light of the other two notions discussed earlier. To define the nature of a treaty, we would have first to know the nature of the countries that agreed to its clauses—that is, to have a clear idea of what is and what is not dar alislam. We have already come up against the difficulty of defining this concept, and it seems that, if used to explain our contemporary world, the concept of dar al-ahd is more a description of a “war-free situation” than an adequate definition of an “area where Muslims live.” This makes it an interesting and useful idea, but it is not completely appropriate, for three reasons:

1. It no longer seems possible to use this concept without caution,founded as it is on a vision of two virtual entities (dar al-islam and dar al-harb), which are taken, in our time, to have reached agreement. These entities have no actual and defined existence, and treaties, because of complex political influences and the unequal struggle for power, are not the expression of agreement between two or more independent, free governments.

2. To use the same word (ahd) to refer both to treaties between countries and relations between Muslims and a State (and its constitution) would lead to a deep blurring of its meaning, because the content to which it refers is not in the least of the same nature in both cases. It appears that the use of these three old concepts has drawn some ulama to neglect some important geopolitical facts that should, on the contrary, be taken into consideration, since they influence profoundly the new vision of the world that we must develop.

3. At a deeper level, to consider that we are, as citizens, in a kind ofcontract with a “non-Islamic” society perpetuates the idea that we are not in our own society but that we are coming to terms with an entity with which we do not identify. The notion of ahd used in this way is quite different from the idea of a “social contract” between a citizen and an entity of which he is part and in which he feels himself to have full membership. To speak of dar al-ahd does nothing to make this an effective reality in the minds of Muslims.

   Thus, a study of the debates taking place between the ulama shows that there is quite a gap between the classical concepts and the current state of affairs (al-waqi). A few ulama give the latter priority and try to adapt and modify the content of these concepts, while others, held by the fiqh tradition, end up simplifying the reality and perpetuating a binary view of the world that is no longer at all appropriate.⁸ These developments reveal the gaps in the approach of many ulama: it is clear that, as well as having an inadequate conceptual framework at their disposal, they lack a deep understanding of the new political and economic landscape that confronts them.