The two preceding chapters have sketched at various levels the outline of an Islamic structure of reference. Tawhid (the oneness of God), the Sharia (the path to faithfulness), and the three notions of maslaha (the common good), ijtihad (intellectual effort and critique of legal formulations), and fatwa (circumstantial legal opinion) represent respectively the Source in the absolute, the way that leads to it in the relative circumstances of time, and the instruments that allow the human intelligence to make the connection between the absolute and the relative, the essential and the accidental, or, in other words, universal principles and the contingent realities of human societies. We should be even more precise in affirming that the “path to faithfulness” requires the definition of the “common good” in a given society, the continuous exercise of “critical work on legal formulations,” and the exposition of “legal opinions” in step with the new realities of the world. Faithfulness in time is possible only if human reason, using the instruments put at its disposal, is active and creative in putting forward original proposals in tune with the time and place. In this sense, new answers connected with the Source are faithful answers, just as there is no faithfulness without renewal.
Western Muslims cannot take short cuts in this work: if they want to live in the “way of faithfulness,” if they want to determine the direction of their “path toward the Source,” they have to engage in a deep and constant labor of reform inspired by the “comprehensive nature of the message of Islam.” In the last analysis, it is a matter of avoiding an integration that depends on a collection of legal opinions aimed at protection and instead suggesting a route that will allow Muslims to establish themselves freely and confidently and that will open the way for them to make a contribution. With regard to the classical Islamic works to which contemporary ulama have been referring for a long time, and taking into account the social, cultural, and political realities Muslims are facing, three questions are fundamental and urgently demand precise answers if we are to build a future for ourselves in the West: Where are we? Who are we? and finally, In what way do we want to belong?
If the old answers seem to us today to be obsolete, we are nevertheless bound to propose something other than a hodgepodge of ideas that drag Muslims either into “living in the West out of the West” or into “becoming Muslims without Islam.” Between the ghetto and dissolution, Western paths toward faithfulness must be constructed on solid, consistent, and coherent foundations based on a double dialectical approach encompassing both the contextualized study of the texts and the study of the context in the light of the texts. The foregoing analyses provide us with some keys to this.
The West: The Abode of Testimony
We know the two old widespread concepts of dar al-islam and dar al-harb. If we do some research into them, we find that they do not occur either in the Qur’an or in the Sunna. In fact, they do not belong to the fundamental sources of Islam, in which principles are essentially given for the universe (lil-alamin), for all times and across all frontiers.
It was the ulama who, during the early centuries, when considering the state of the world—its geographical divisions, the powers that were in place across religious affiliations, and their influence and the forces at work in changing allegiances—began to classify and define the various areas in and around the places in which they lived. This process was important and necessary for at least two reasons. On the one hand, by identifying which were the Islamic territories, the ulama were able to indicate both what the essential conditions were for an area or a nation to be considered Islamic and also what regulations should govern political and strategic relations established with other nations and empires. On the other, it allowed them to make a clear distinction in legal matters between the situation of Muslims living within the Muslim world and that of Muslims living abroad, or of those who traveled a lot, such as merchants (who, consequently, needed specific regulations).
After studying the attitude of the Prophet after the peace of Hudaybiyya (sulh al-Hudaybiyya), his sending of numerous messengers to various rulers during the five years that followed,2 and his behavior toward neighboring countries, the classical scholars arrived at the conclusion that four elements had to be identified and taken into account: 1. the population living in the country; 2. the ownership of the land; 3. the nature of the government; 4. the laws applied in the country. The Prophet—consideringhimself in the light of Revelation as a Messenger to the whole world—according to Ibn Hisham, sent at least nine delegations in five years to the peoples of the neighboring countries who knew nothing about Islam, or whose leaders had no real knowledge of the new religion and who founded their judgments on vague conjectures. In two famous cases, the attitude of the rulers toward the Prophet’s messengers led to wars (which was certainly not the purpose of these delegations nor the rule that was meant to be applied to relations with neighboring countries). A war took place first against the Byzantines because the Prophet’s messenger, Harith ibn Umayr, was killed by Amr al-Ghassani, one of the ministers of the Empire. A second conflict took place with the Persians when their leader tore up the Qur’an in front of the messenger and told his soldiers to go and bring him back “this Muhammad alive.” These two reactions were understood by the Muslims as declarations of war, but in most other cases the message was spread without war or hindrance. The priority was clearly to spread the message of Islam among the population. The local rulers at that time were the immediate means of achieving this objective, for Islam was primarily a message for the people (lil-nas), according to the Qur’anic formula, rather than a guidance addressed to the authorities.
Basing their thinking on these facts, the ulama strove to deduce clear principles and to distinguish and categorize the characteristics of so-called Islamic areas and countries and those of non-Islamic territory. In the first centuries of Islam, taking into consideration the reality with which they were confronted, the ulama could formulate a general conception of the world only in terms of this binary vision. Thus, before there was any contextualized definition, the first fundamental rule dealing with relations between Muslims and non-Muslims on the basis of the actions of the Prophet was that there was considered to be a “state of peace” and not “a state of war.” The second was that the Prophet wanted above all to address the people and not to seize power. The tradition shows that he always decided to fight the rulers because of their murders, treachery, and injustices and that he never fought against populations because they refused to convert to Islam. He wanted them to choose Islam in full knowledge of what it was; when they knew, he accepted their choice and recognized their right to stay where they were living and practice their religion. NonMuslim populations paid a tax (al-jizya) in exchange for the protection of the State.
Having drawn out these essential points, the ulama still had to define the two entities, dar al-islam and dar al-harb, so as to have a clear vision of the geopolitical reality of their time. Numerous definitions were proposed, specifically within the four principle Sunni schools of law. We cannot here give a detailed study of their respective studies, but it is useful to make the following points.
Dear prof Ramdan!
the concept of al jizya is in dire need to be researched on, especially when Qur’anic concept mentioned in Surah Al Tauba is quite different from generally assumed concept. Qur’an says this is not to be taken from common man, rather it will be taken from authority or government as a part of treaty after war.
thanks
with best regards